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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Agricultural banks have traditionally had a high degree of insulation
from interest rate movements because of a localized deposit structure and
a stable operating environment, but recent changes in the national banking
structure have caused the agricultural banking industry to face increased
risk. Bank deregulation resulting from the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) has allowed urban
banks and other institutions to compete directly with agricultural banks
for funds. Moreover, since the 1970s rural savers have gained direct
access to a wider assortment of savings instruments. As a result,
agricultural banks have had to replace non-interest bearing demand
deposits and low-interest savings accounts with higher yielding
instruments, such as Money Market Certificates (MMCs), as their principal
source of funds. They no longer have a large collection of interest-free
deposits that they can use to insulate themselves from interest rate
changes. In addition, interest rates have become much more volatile in
the past six years. This is due in part to the fact that the Federal
Reserve Board, in an attempt to hold down inflation, no longer aims its
policy towards holding interest rates down, but instead towards limiting
the money supply. The result of these changes is that agricultural banks
are now subjected to increased interest rate risk.
The three methods often suggested for reducing interest rate risk -
using variable rate loans, shortening loan maturities and matching
maturities of assets with maturities of liabilities - have serious
drawbacks in their applications. Variable rate loans essentially transfer
Interest rate risk from the lenders to the borrowers. But, an increase in
borrower risk means an increase in another type of risk for lenders - the
risk of their customers defaulting on their loans. Shorter maturities on
loans reduce interest rate risk, and agricultural lenders have been using
this method for some time (Lins, 1984, p. 117). It is essentially another
way of applying variable rate loans. But, this practice only creates more
stress for the farmers (since they have to refinance more often). It also
limits the types of loans these banks can offer, thereby reducing the
competitiveness of these banks and diminishing their effectiveness as
intermediaries. Matching maturities of assets and liabilities would allow
agricultural banks to guarantee their profit margins on specific loans.
Unfortunately, due to the small size of most of these banks and the
seasonal nature of their loan operations, it may be difficult for them to
do so. Furthermore, they would be sacrificing profit potential that might
exist from using lower rate, short-term liabilities for funding longer-
term loans. And besides, isn't the intermediation of mismatched
maturities one of the primary duties of banks? These drawbacks suggest a
need for an alternative method of reducing interest rate risk, such as
hedging with interest rate futures.
The volatile interest rates of recent years have given rise to the
successful development of interest rate futures contracts on the major
exchanges. The effectiveness of these contracts in hedging against
interest rate fluctuations, both through direct hedging and cross-hedging,
has been analyzed by Ederington (1979), Franckle (1980), Ciccheti, Dale
and Vignola (X981), Senchack and Easterwood (1983) and Overdahl (1984),
among others. Furthermore, Drabenstott and McDonley (1982a) have
maintained that interest rate futures can be effectively used by
agricultural banks as well as large, money center banks, particularly in
managing liabilities. They suggest, as one possibility, using T-bill
futures to cross-hedge 6-month MMCs.
By hedging its liabilities, an agricultural bank attempts to transfer
its interest rate risk to the speculator in the futures market. With this
transfer of risk, the bank protects itself against unexpected rate
increases, but it also passes any potential to gain from rate increases on
to the speculator. If the bank can forecast, with some degree of
confidence, which direction interest rates will move, might it not gain
from following a strategy of hedging when it expects rates to increase and
not hedging when it expects rates to decrease? Can it adopt this
"selective hedging" strategy without exposing itself to any more interest
rate risk than it would have faced had it hedged all the time? The
objective of this study is to evaluate selected decision rules which will
allow agricultural banks to pay significantly lower liability rates than
they would by adopting an "always hedge" strategy, without exposing
themselves to additional interest rate risk.
In this study, selective hedging strategies will be examined for a
hypothetical agricultural bank hedging 3-raonth and 6-month MMCs. The bank
will base its decisions of whether or not to hedge on forecasts of future
interest rates. Two sets of forecast data will be tested. One set is
based on T-bill futures prices, while the other set is based on quarterly
forecasts of 90-day T-bills supplied by the American Statistical
Institute. The MMC rates the bank faces as a result of following the
selective hedging strategy will be compared to the rates resulting from
the "always hedge" and "never hedge" strategies. In addition, established
methods of judging hedging effectiveness (Senchack and Easterwood, 1983)
will be used to determine whether the selective hedging strategy reduces
interest rate risk as well as the "always hedge" strategy.
In Chapter II, background material on the MMC market and the interest
rate futures market is provided. The hedging process is explained, and
various hedging strategies are discussed. Chapter III contains the
theoretical background for this study, including an outline of previous
work and an introduction to the theory that will be used in the empirical
section. In Chapter XV, the empirical results are presented and
interpreted. The study is concluded in Chapter V.
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON LIABILITY MARKETS,
INTEREST RATE FUTURES AND HEDGING
Chapter II contains background material that is required for a clear
understanding of interest rate futures and how they can be used by agri
cultural banks. The chapter begins with a discussion of the liability
markets faced by agricultural banks. It continues with an explanation of
the interest rate futures markets and the concepts of hedging and cross-
hedging. Finally, hedging strategies for agricultural banks are
discussed.
Money Market Certificates
Prior to 1978, agricultural banks acquired the majority of their
loanable funds from non-interest bearing demand deposits and heavily
regulated savings and time deposits. The only money market instruments
available to them were large ($100,000 or more) Certificates of Deposit
(CDs). Although the CDs were used to some degree, their large size
prevented agricultural banks from utilizing them to any great extent. In
1977, large time deposits represented 7.9% of all financial claims against
banks with total assets of less than $1 million at years end (Cole, 1981,
p. 483).
In 1978, deregulation of the banking industry allowed the creation of
a smaller-sized, short-term money market time deposit, the 6-month Money
Market Certificate. The minimum size of these new instruments was
$10,000, compared to the $100,000 minimum on regular CDs. The rate
ceilings on the 6-month MMC was tied to the rates on 6-month U.S. Treasury
Bills. The 6-month MMC gained in popularity rather quickly, accounting
for roughly one-third of all interest-bearing liabilities at small banks
by 1981. It has been credited with being the instrument "most responsible
for the changing structure at small banks" (Opper, 1982, p. 456).
Restrictions on MMCs have been relaxed in recent years. Their
minimum deposit has been lowered to $1,000, increasing their accessibility
to small investors. Banks have been allowed to offer them in 1-month and
3-month maturities, in addition to the original 6-raonth maturity.
However, the use of MMCs by small banks is still largely attributed to the
6-raonth variety. Apparently, the shorter-term liabilities are not as
popular with small banks. This phenomenon may have something to do with
lending cycles associated with agriculture. Since most non-real estate
agricultural loans tend to be between six months and one year in length,
agricultural lenders would probably prefer to offer liabilities of at
least six months or more.
Continued deregulation of the banking industry allowed a potential
competitor to the 6-month MMC, the Money Market Depository Account (MMDA),
to be introduced in December, 1982. The MMDAs offered money market rates
(with no ceilings on them) on accounts with minimum deposits of $2,500.
(Since that time, the minimum deposit has been lowered to $1000.)
Customers were allowed six automatic or telephone transfers per month
(three by check) and unlimited withdrawals in person. These accounts
quickly became very popular; balances held in MMDAs totalled more than
$340 billion within four months their introduction. By comparison, it
Cook nearly two years for the 6—month MMC to reach that level (Furlong,
1983, p. 319).
The initial purpose of the MMDAs was to provide commercial banks with
a tool for competing with the Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs), being
offered by non-depository institutions. This objective was met to some
extent, as is indicated by contractions experienced in the investment
industry during the first four months of the MMDAs' existence. However,
by mid-1983 it became clear that most of the MMDA balances came from other
depository accounts, particularly savings and small time deposits,
including 6-month MMCs. This occurrence can be partially attributed to
the fact that MMDA rates were very high initially, making them not only
more attractive than MMMFs but practically all savings and small time
deposits.
Large, money center banks fared much better than small banks as a
result of this movement of liabilities into MMDAs. Most large banks were
able to widen their net interest margins because they switched many of
their liabilities from higher-cost managed liabilities, such as large CDs,
to lower cost MMDAs. Smaller banks had fewer managed liabilities to begin
with, so most of the movement of their liabilities was out of lower-cost
regulated deposits (such as demand deposits and passbook savings accounts)
into MMDAs, now paying a market-determined rate. As a result, the net
interest margins of small, agricultural banks declined during this time
(Danker and McLaughlin, 1984, p. 802).
The introduction of MMDAs does not appear to have diminished the
importance of MMCs as funding instruments for small banks. During 1983,
8there was a 4.5% increase in assets funded by retail-type savings and
small time deposits (including MMCs), MMDAs and Super NOWs (the savings
and loan industry's answer to MMDAs). During that time, there was a 3.5%
decline in money market liabilities (large CDs) and a 1% decline in demand
deposits. Small time deposits diminished in importance during the first
half of 1983, but they rebounded during the second half as MMDA rates
trended downward and small time deposits were deregulated in October of
that year (Danker and McLaughlin, 1984, p. 804-805). This indicates that
MMCs remain important funding instruments for small banks.
Interest Rate Futures Contracts
Interest rate futures were first offered in 1975 when the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBOT) established their GNMA Collateralized Depository
Receipt (CDR) contract. The following year the International Monetary
Market (IMM) established a contract on 90-day U.S. Treasury Bills. Since
then contracts on U.S. Treasury Bonds and U.S. Treasury Notes have been
introduced at the CBOT, and contracts on CDs have been introduced at the
IMM. In 1981, the Mid-America Commodity Exchange (Mid-Am) introduced
"mini-contracts" on T-bonds and T-bills. These contracts form a secondary
market based on the CBOT and IMM contracts and are one-half the size of
the originals. Tlie three contracts which will be considered for hedging
short-term liabilities are the IMM T-bill, the IMM CD and the Mid-Am T-
bill.
The IMM T-bill contract represents a promise to buy (or sell) $1
million in 13-week U.S. Treasury bills during a three day period in either
March, June, September or December, depending upon the month specified by
the contract. It is the most heavily traded of the three to be considered
here, with an estimated volume of 8,790 contracts on 5/30/85. This
relatively large volume provides substantial liquidity for hedgers and
speculators, making it less likely for them to get "stuck" in any
particular position.
The IMM CD contract represents a promise to buy (or sell) a $1
million Domestic "no-name" Certificate of Deposit with a 3~raonth
maturity.^ The delivery must occur between the 16th and the last day of
the trading month. The CD contract was designed with a larger delivery
period than the one for T-bill futures in order to increase the amount of
deliverable CDs. Since the CD contract is based on bank CDs, rather than
government securities, it is possible that its price movements match the
rate changes of CDs or MMCs better than the T-bill contract, making it a
better hedging tool. However, the CD's volume is much lower than the T-
bill's (estimated volume of 425 contracts on 4/30/85), so it does not
provide as much liquidity to investors. Therefore, the hedger must choose
between liquidity and hedging efficiency.
The Mid-Am T-bill contract represents a promise to buy or sell
$500,000 in 13-week T-bills. It is based on the IMM T-bill contract,
traded in the same months, and its price is based on the same index. The
smaller size if this contracts provides an opportunity for smaller
institutions to hedge. Unfortunately, its trading volume is even lower
"No-name" CDs refer to those CDs coming from the largest domestic
banks. These CDs are generally of homogeneously high quality, so the
investor is indifferent as to which bank is the Issuer (Overdahl, 1984,
p. 8).
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than the IMM CD contract's (estimated at 130 contracts on 5/30/85). Thus,
many institutions may shy away from using the Mid-Am contract because they
are concerned about liquidity.
This study will concentrate on cross-hedging possibilities between 6
and 3-month MMCs and T-bill futures. T-bill futures were chosen because
the large volume traded in the IMM T-bill contract provides the most
liquidity for the hedger. The effects that liquidity has on the success
rate of the hedges will not be tested, so the instrument which offers the
greatest liquidity was chosen. Also, the results using the IMM T-bill
contract could be easily translated to the case of a cross-hedge using
Mid-Am T-bill "Minis", since the Mid-Am contract forms a secondary market
based on the IMM contract. Although the current trading volume in the
Mid-Am contract is low, its smaller size might make it more attractive to
small banks in the future, possibly causing volume to increase to a point
where liquidity no longer is a factor.
Because of the lack of time series data available on MMC rates, CD
rates will be used in the empirical analysis of this study. MMCs are
basically smaller versions of the CDs, so they tend to follow the rate
change of their larger cousins. Thus, the substitution should not
radically affect the results of this analysis.
Pricing specifications
Cash T-bills are priced on a discount basis; the purchaser of a $1
million T-bill pays $1 million minus a discount for the bill at the time
of the purchase and receives $1 million for it at maturity. T-bill yields
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are quoted as a 360-day (annualized) discount rate yield, based on the
discount from the face amount at purchase.
Annualized Discount Rate Yield ^ [Discount/Face Value] X
[360/Days to Maturity]
The prices of Che T-bill contract at the IMM are based on a simple index
equal to 100 minus the discount rate yield.
IMM T-bill Futures Index = 100 - Annualized Discount Rate Yield
For example, if the annualized discount rate yield equals 8.25%, then the
futures price would be 91.75 (=100-8.25).
Cash CDs are quoted on a bank add-on basis rather than a discount
basis; the purchaser of a $1 million CD pays at the outset and receives $1
million plus interest when the CD matures. Market quotes of CD rates are
based on a 365-day year bond equivalent yield calculation.
Interest Rate Futures Hedging
A hedge in interest rate futures offers protection against sudden,
unexpected price changes in financial instruments resulting from volatile
interest rates. Individuals, banks and other financial intermediaries can
conceivably benefit from a successful hedging strategy.
Those planning to purchase a financial instrument at a future date
can protect themselves from an unexpected drop in interest rates (thus an
unexpected increase in the price of the instrument) by purchasing interest
rate futures. This activity is similar to a long hedge in the commodity
markets. Just as a future purchaser of a commodity (say a grain processor
planning to purchase corn) trades away price risk in order to "lock in" a
future price, the investor buys interest rate futures in order to lock in
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current rates and trades away interest rate risk to guarantee a return on
his/her investment.
Consider an investor who expects to receive $1 million three months
hence and plans to invest that amount in U.S. Treasury Bonds. If s/he
suspects that interest rate are at their peak, s/he can may want to buy 10
each of $100,000 CBOT T-bond futures. (Working through a clearing house,
s/he does not have to pay the full $1,000,000, only a portion to cover the
maximum potential loss for the next day.) In three months, s/he will sell
the futures and purchase the bonds on the cash (spot) market. If rates
fall (prices rise), the profit s/he earned on the futures will reflect the
increased return s/he would have experienced had s/he been able to take a
cash position right away. If rates rise (prices fall), the loss on the
futures market will reflect the loss of profit s/he would have experienced
had s/he been able to invest right away.
Those planning to issue fixed income securities can protect their
holding through the sale of futures. This activity is comparable to
taking a short position in the commodity futures markets. Just as a grain
or livestock producer sells futures in order to lock in the current
selling price, a bank or other financial intermediary can sell interest
rate futures to lock in interest rates. The commodities hedger trades
away price risk to guarantee his return; the financial hedger trades away
interest rate risk to guarantee funding costs.
Consider a bank planning to issue $10 million in CDs, three months
from now. If it expects that rates will increase before that time, it may
want to sell 10 CD contracts, each with a face value of $1 million. In
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three months, it will buy back the CD futures and sell the CDs in the cash
market. If CD rates rise (prices fall), the profit it earned on the short
sale in the futures market will reflect the lower funding cost the bank
would have experienced had it been able to offer the CDs at the lower
rates of three months back. If rates fall (prices rise), the loss on the
futures market reflects the increased cost of funding the bank would have
faced had it been able to offer the CDs at the lower rates of three months
ago.
Basis risk
A critical assumption that has been made here is Chat cash prices and
futures prices move together identically. In reality, they tend to move
in the same direction in only a roughly parallel pattern. The arithmetic
difference between the cash price and the futures price is called the
basis. Changes in the basis tend to be much smaller than either cash or
futures price movements. By placing a hedge, the individual is trading
away price or interest rate risk for (a much smaller) basis risk. The
basis in financial futures is defined differently than it is for commodity
futures.
For commodity futures, the basis is defined as the futures price
minus the current price, whereas for interest rate futures the basis is
generally defined as the current price minus the futures price. Futures
prices on commodities tend to be higher than the spot prices, due to
(generally positive) inflationary expectations and the fact that it costs
money to hold a commodity (storage costs, for example). With financial
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futures, the futures price tends to be lower than the current spot price
(although they are sometimes higher). There are no storage costs incurred
from holding a large quantity of T-bonds or T-bills, as there are from
holding a carload of grain. Actually, due to the time value of money, a
financial instrument earns interest, either explicitly or implicitly.
This puts downward pressure on the futures price, relative to the current
price. Rising interest rate expectations (discounted intrument prices are
expected to drop) put downward pressure on futures prices, relative to the
current price. Falling interest rate expectations (discounted instrument
prices are expected to rise) put upward pressure on futures prices.
Therefore, interest rate expectations may either reinforce or contradict
the effect the time value of money has on the basis.
For money market instruments, such as T-bills and CDs, the basis has
a natural progression towards zero as the contract nears maturity. Cash
money market instruments have changing maturities; if they have a 91-day
maturity one day, they have a 90-day maturity the next. This affects
their prices, which are directly related to the time to maturity. Futures
have a fixed maturity as long as they are held - 91 days for T-bills and
3-months for CDs. As a futures contract approaches its delivery date, its
maturity becomes more like the maturity of the cash market instrument on
which it is based. Due to arbitraging opportunities which would arise,
the spot and futures prices should converge, moving the basis towards
zero.
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Cross-hedging
Not all financial instruments have a matching futures contract with
which to hedge. Also, some contracts (particularly the newer ones) do not
have enough volume to allow easy movement in and out of a position, thus
making the hedge riskier. Given these circumstances, individuals or
institutions may want to set up a cross-hedge with a different, but
related, futures contract to hedge their cash positions. They should be
aware that Che cash and futures prices are usually less correlated for a
cross-hedge than they are for a standard hedge, causing the basis to be
more volatile and making the basis risk greater. The basis should be
watched carefully when a cross-hedge is in place.
The choice of the futures contract to be used in the cross-hedge (as
well as whether or not Co undertake one) involves careful examination of
the basis relationship between the cash instrument and the potential
futures contract. Powers and Vogel (1984) named four factors to be
considered in a basis relationship. They are:
1) Credit worthiness. If the credit rating of the cash instrument
deviates from that of the futures contract, the correlation of the
price movements will be adversely affected.
2) Maturity. The closer the two instruments are in maturity, the
more they reflect the same time-value judgements.
3) Liquidity. The markets for both instruments should be relatively
liquid, otherwise market factors other than the level of interest
rates will affect their prices and Che basis will be subject to
wider fluctuations.
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4) Supply and demand factors. Limited or intermittent supply and
demand may cause the price of the instruments to fluctuate,
increasing basis variations.
(Powers and Vogel, 1984, pp. 186-187),
Because the price movements of the cash instrument are not identical
to those of the futures instrument, simply matching the total dollar
amount of futures to be traded with the cash position may not provide an
optimal hedge. An optimal hedge ratio for cross-hedging two distinctly
different instruments was determined by Senchack and Easterwood (1983) and
Overdahl (1984) when they looked at cross-hedging CDs with T-bill futures.
They did this by comparing changes in the futures rate with changes in the
implied forward spot rate. This procedure will be explained in more
detail in Chapter 3.
In the search for futures to use in a cross-hedge with 3-inonth or 6-
month MMCs, CD futures and T-bill futures are the prime candidates. Of
the two, CD futures more closely match MMCs in terras of credit worthiness
and supply and demand factors. Both CD and T-bill futures match
maturities with 3-month MMCs and are one-half the maturity of 6-month MMCs
(still comparatively close). T-bill futures were chosen over CD futures
for this study because their liquidity was greater.
Hedging Strategies for an Agricultural Bank
When a bank decides to use futures to hedge its exposure to interest
rate risk, it must choose between two different types of hedges, short
hedges and long hedges. With a short hedge, the bank is protected from
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the risk of rising interest rates. For example, a bank planning to issue
a liability three months hence faces the risk of interest rates rising
before that time, resulting in higher liability costs. By selling futures
on the same (or related) instrument now, the bank will be able to hedge
against a rate increase. If interest rates do indeed rise, the gain in
the futures market will offset the loss in the cash market. With a long
hedge, the bank hedges the risk of falling interest rates. For example, a
bank planning to invest $1 million three months hence faces the risk of
rates falling before that time, resulting in a diminished return on that
investment. By buying futures, the bank can lock in current rates and
hedge against that risk.
A specific hedging strategy that might be used by an agricultural
bank would be to cross-hedge 6-month or.3-month MMCs with T-bill futures.
Consider a bank planning to issue loans ranging anywhere from six months
to two years. This bank probably has a limited market for funds, making
it difficult to attract liabilities with maturities similar to these
loans. Furthermore, lower short-term liability rates provide a way for
this bank to widen its profit margin. Unfortunately, funding the longer-
term loans with short-term liabilities, such as 6-month or 3-raonth MMCs,
would leave the bank exposed to interest rate risk. By cross-hedging the
MMCs with futures, such as T-bills, the bank could lock in current MMC
rates and reduce its exposure to interest rate risk.
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Macro vs. micro hedging
When establishing a hedging strategy, Drabenstott and McDonley (1984)
recoraraend that the bank first look at its exposure to interest rate risk
from a "macro" perspective and then proceed to a "micro" perspective.
Macro-hedges reduce, or eliminate, the entire bank's exposure to interest
rate risk, whereas micro-hedges are hedges of specific assets or
liabilities. The danger of micro-hedging is that it leaves open the
possibility of placing a "double hedge." An example of a double hedge
would be the situation in which a liability already matched by an asset is
hedged so that its rate is locked in at the current level. If the rates
go down, the asset rate drops, but the liability rate remains at the
current level. In this case the hedge increases, rather than reduces, the
bank's risk exposure. Taking a macro-perspective will alert the bank of a
liability/asset match-up and prevent the formation of a double hedge.
Upon taking a macro-perspective, the bank will probably find that it
needs to place fewer hedges than it thought necessary under Che strictly
micro-perspective. Thus, its transaction costs will be reduced. After
the bank determines its risk exposure and identifies the assets and
liabilities to be hedged, it still has to deal with specific groups of
assets and liabilities. In this sense, the hedge strategy takes on a
"micro" perspective.
One drawback attributed to macro—hedging is the expense of gathering
all the information on the bank's interest rate risk exposure. A bank
might think it is easier to let each of its departments handle its own
risk exposure separately. Kolb, Tirame and Gay (1984) considered this
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problem, but still concluded that a macro-view is more efficient than
individual micro-hedges. Furthermore, a small bank would probably have
lower information-gathering costs than a large one, implying that it would
be even easier for a small bank to implement a macro-hedge. Drabenstott
and McDonley (1984) recommend using sensitivity analysis to determine
their interest rate exposure for taking a "macro" perspective.
Selective hedging
If the bank has reasonable expectations that interest rates will move
in its favor, it may be willing to accept some degree of risk exposure.
Thus, it may decide that only part (or perhaps none) of the exposure to
interest rate risk should be hedged. Clearly, this is a decision of
whether or not to reduce risk, not how to reduce risk. In this study, an
attempt will be made at designing a "selective hedging" strategy, in which
a bank bases its decisions of whether or not to hedge on its expectations
of interest rates.
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Chapter III explains the theoretical material needed for the analysis
in this study. The first section covers previous studies of hedging
efficiency and optimal hedge ratios. The second section outlines the
analysis to be used in the empirical section of this study.
Previous Studies of Hedging Performance
The earliest studies of the hedging performance of the financial
futures markets were direct applications of the techniques developed for
the commodity futures markets by Johnson (1960), Stein (1961) and others.
Ederington (1979), Franckle (1980) and Cicchetti, Dale and Vignola (1981)
looked at hedges of currently held cash positions in financial futures,
just as Johnson and the others had looked at hedges of cash positions in
the commodity markets. Eventually, differences between hedging in the
financial futures markets and hedging in the commodity futures markets
became more clearly defined as differences between the nature of commodity
futures and financial futures were stressed. Franckle and Senchack (1982)
made the claim that a different type of hedge,* called an anticipatory
hedge, was relevant to financial futures. With an anticipatory hedge the
position being hedged has not yet been taken, but it is expected to be
taken in the future. Along with this new type of hedge, a new approach to
hedging theory was taken by Senchack and Easterwood (1983), Overdahl
(1984) and others. In this section, we will examine these developments of
hedging performance theory for financial futures.
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Cash hedging
We begin by looking at traditional hedging theory. The traditional,
naive hedge requires that a position be taken in the futures market equal
in magnitude and opposite in direction to the spot, or cash, position.
1 2For example, let and be the spot or cash prices at times t^^and
respectively. The gain or loss on the unhedged position, U, of X units is
2 1 12 . •
X[P - P ]. Letting P_ and P^ represent the futures prices at times t,
s s t t
and the gain or loss in the hedged position, H, of X units is
2 12 1
X{[P - P ] - [P^ - P^]^- Traditional theory argues that since the spot
s s ft
and futures prices generally move together, then Var(H) < Var(U), thereby
reducing risk (Ederington (1979), p. 159).
Portfolio theory, unlike traditional hedging theory, allows hedgers
to hold both hedged and unhedged stocks. Using previous studies of
portfolio theory in commodity futures by Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961),
Ederington applied it to financial futures. In this model, Ederington
assumed that cash market holdings were being hedged as if they were
storable conimodities. Letting U represent the return on an unhedged
position,
(3.1) E(U) = XE[P^ - P^]
s s s
(3.2) Var(U) =
s s
Let R represent the return on a porfolio which includes both spot market
holdings and futures market holdings X^:
(3.3) E(R) = XE[P^ - pM + X_E[P^ - P^] - K(X_)
s s s f f f f
(3.4) Var(R) = X^a^ + xlal + 2X X^a ^
ss ff sfsf
2 2where K(X^) represents brokerage and other transaction costs and CJ , a ,
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represent the subjective variances and the covariance of the possible
price changes from time t^ to t2«
Let b = ~X./X represent the proportion of the spot position which is
^ s
hedged, known as the hedge ratio. Since X. and X usually have opposite
L S
signs, b is usually positive. Inserting b into (3.3) and (3.4), we get
(3.5) Var(R) = X^[ ^ +b ^ - 2b .]
s s f s f
and
(3.6) ECR) == X[ECP^ - P^) - bE(P^ - pb] - K(X ,b)
S S S It X
« X[(l-b)E(P^ - pb + bE(P^ - pb - bE(P^ - pb]
S S S S S £ I
- K(X^,b)
2 2 11Or, letting E( B) « E[P^ - P - (P - P )] represent the expected change
IT d £3
in the basis,
(3.7) E(R) = X [Cl-b)ECS) - bE( B)] - K(X b)
S X
2 1where E(S) « E(P - P ) is the expected price change on one unit of the
8 S
Spot commodity. If E( B) = 0, then the expected gain or loss is reduced
as b approaches one. Holding X constant,
s
(3.8) Var(R)/ b = X^ [2b J - 2 _]
s f sf
so the risk minimizing b is
(3.9) b* = 2
Also,
(3.10) E(R)/ b = -X [E( B) - E(S)] - K(X_.b)/ b
s t
Ederington compared the risk on an unhedged position with the minimum
risk obtained on a portfolio containing both spot and futures holdings.
He used the percent reduction in the variance of the unhedged position as
a measure of hedging performance.
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(3.11) e = 1 - Var(R*)/Var(U)
where Var(R ) denotes the minimum variance on a portfolio containing
security futures. Subsitituting equation (3.9) into equation (3.5)
yields
(3.12) Var(R*) =xj[ ^ \J 2 l
3 8 Sf f Sf f
« X^r 2 - 2,2,
S^ 3 sf' f^
Consequently,
(3.13) e = 1^/1= 2
2 .
where is the population coefficient of determination between the change
in the cash price and the change in the futures price. He tested the
2
effectiveness of hedges of cash holdings by estimating using the
. . . . 2
coefficient of determination, r ^ from the following equation:
(3.14) P? - pi = + (P^ - P^) + u
It s s
2
The r value gives the percentage risk reduction of the hedged position
★
over the unhedged position. The risk-minimizing b (the optimal hedge
ratio) is indicated by the inverse of the estimated value for
Ederington (1979) tested the effectiveness of two-week and four-week
hedges of GNMA and T-bill holdings. He found the GNMA hedge to be
2reasonably effective, with r values of 0.664 for a two-week hedge and
0.785 for a four-week hedge in the nearby contracts. These numbers
suggested that a two-week hedge in the current GNMA contract reduced risk
by approximately 66.4 percent, while a four-week hedge reduced risk by
about 78.5 percent. He also tried contracts further into the future and
got similar results. His results for the hedge in T-bills were not nearly
2
as good. In the two-week hedge, the nearby contract had an r value of
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2
0.272. (As a point of comparison, the r values for a two-week hedge in
the nearby contract of Corn and Wheat were 0.898 and 0.649, respec
tively. )
In a follow-up article, Charles Franckle (1980) pointed out that
Ederington used Friday closing prices for T-bill futures and weekly
averages for the cash price data. He contended that these weekly averages
tended to "mask" much of the relevent price changes (Franckle, 1980,
p. 1274). By matching Friday to Friday changes in futures prices with
Friday to Friday changes in the bid price of 90 day T-bills, Franckle got
2
an r value of 0.679, comparing favorably with the GNMA and Corn markets.
Later, Paul Cicchetti, Charles Dale and Anthony J. Vignola (1981)
were able to improve on Ederington's and Franckle's findings by focusing
on interest rate changes, rather than price changes. They pointed out
that T-bills are discount instruments which do not have coupon payments
and do not bear interest. Thus, if spot interest rates remain constant,
the cash price of a T-bill will increase because of the decrease in
remaining term to maturity. On the other hand, if futures interest rates
remain constant, the prices of the futures contracts will remain constant.
A hedger wants to protect against instantaneous price changes other than
those caused by a change in the term to maturity (Cicchetti et al., 1981,
p. 380). By using interest rate changes instead of price changes to
estimate hedging effectiveness, they were able to take the constant yield
accumulation out of the price of a Treasury bill (Cicchetti et al., 1981,
p. 383). The results Cicchetti et al. obtained from testing this model
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2
gave an r value of 0.755 for a two-week hedge and 0.833 for a four-week
hedge in the nearby contract.
Anticipatory hedging
In the studies conducted by Ederington and the others, currently held
cash positions were hedged. As Franckle and Senchack (1982), Senchack and
Easterwood (1983), Overdahl (1984) and others have observed, this approach
is not appropriate for financial futures. Financial instruments, unlike
many agricultural commodities, are not storable goods; their maturity (and
value) change from one day to the next. A 91-day T-bill today becomes a
90-day T-bill tomorrow. This makes it difficult to hedge a currently held
cash position in financial instruments. Over time, the instrument
purchased or issued in the cash market becomes less and less like the
instrument in the futures market, causing their rate movements to not
2
correlate well.
Franckle and Senchack (1982) and the others have described a
different type of hedge to be used with financial futures: the anticipa
tory hedge. In an anticipatory hedge, a cash position not yet taken, but
expected to be taken in the future, is hedged in the futures market. A
storable commodity is not needed for this type of hedge. Since the
financial instrument is not being held, it does not have to maintain its
value for the life of the hedge. Thus, an anticipatory hedge can be
2
Ederington's study (and the others that followed) involved such
short-term hedges that changing maturity may not have been as much of a
factor as it would have been if longer-term hedges had been examined.
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easily applied Co financial futures, particularly T-bill and CD futures.
An example of an anticipatory hedge would be if a bank, planning to offer
CDs or MMCs three months hence, wants to hedge against an increase in
rates. The position being hedged is an anticipated position, rather than
a currently held one.
With a cash hedge of a storable commodity, the cash position has
already been taken when the hedge is placed. The individual placing the
hedge does so with the intention of locking in the current price. Thus,
the current price becomes the target. The purpose of the hedge is to
provide protection against unexpected price changes during the life of the
hedge. In an anticipatory hedge in financial futures, the cash position
will not be undertaken until the end of the hedge. The target rate for
the anticipatory hedge is not the current spot rate, but rather the rate
the hedger expects to pay at the end of the hedge. Remember, hedging
provides protection against unexpected rate changes only.
It is important to consider the shape of the yield curve when
analyzing financial futures hedging. If the yield curve is flat, then
rates are not expected to change during the time the hedge is in place.
In this case, the target rate is the current spot rate, since the current
spot rate is expected to prevail at the time the hedge is lifted. In most
cases, however, the yield curve is positively or negatively sloped. A
positive yield curve indicates that the market expects rates to increase,
while a negatively sloped yield curve indicates just the opposite. Given
these expected changes, which are imbedded in the terra structure of the
rates, the current spot rate becomes a biased estimator of the target
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rate. On the other hand, an implied forward rate which takes into account
the expected rate changes that are imbedded in the term structure would be
the correct target for an anticipatory hedge.
The following formula was used by Senchack and Easterwood to
calculate the implied forward rates for CDs.
(3.15) r = [nr - Cn-t)r ]/t
n-t t n n-t
where r is the estimated implied t-nnonth spot rate at the time of the
n-t t r r
hedge's placement; n-t months is the length of the hedge period; and r^
and r are the observed CD cash rates appropriate for the estimation of
n—t
the implied rate. To estimate a 3-month implied rate 3 months from now, a
3-month and a 6-month CD cash rate was used, i.e., n=6 and t=3 (Senchack
and Easterwood, 1983, p. 433-434).
Selective Hedging
Just as hedging reduces the risk of adverse price or interest rate
movements, it also reduces the likelihood of gains being made from
favorable turns in the market. If the institution placing the hedge is
able to forecast market turns with some degree of accuracy, then it may
want to use a selective hedging strategy. Under this strategy, the
institution will hedge if it expects the cash spot market to make an
unfavorable move, and it will not hedge if it is fairly certain that the
spot market will move in its favor.
In this study, we will look at how an agricultural bank will fare if
it follows a selective hedging strategy for managing its 3®ICs. Our
hypothetical agricultural bank will base its strategy on some forecast of
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Interest rates. If the bank expects rates to increase, it will hedge; if
it expects rates to decrease, it will choose not hedge. We want to know
whether the bank, by following this strategy, can significantly reduce its
rates without exposing itself to additional interest rate risk.
Reducing MMC rates
We can start by asking whether an agricultural bank, following the
selective hedging strategy, is able to lower its MMC rates from what they
would be if it followed either a simple "always hedge" or "never hedge"
plan. In order to determine whether the bank would have observed lower
rates by following this strategy, two new statistics are created:
(3.16) RU^ " \
(3.17) RH^ = R^ -
where = MMC rate an unhedged bank pays at time t
= MMC rate a hedged bank pays at time t
a MMC rate a bank pays at time t if it follows selective
hedging strategy.
Amean RU^ significantly less than zero indicates that the bank following
the decision model pays lower MMC rates on the average than it would have
had it not hedged at all. Amean RH^ significantly less than zero
indicates that the bank following the decision model pays lower MMC rates
on the average than it would have had it hedged all the time.
Preserving risk reduction
Suppose that the bank can (on the average) reduce the level of MMC
rates it pays. Can it also preserve the reduced interest rate risk that
29
it would have gained by hedging all of the time? In order to observe
interest rate risk, it is necessary to look at the standard error of the
difference between the target rate (the implied forward rate) and the
actual, effective rate paid by the bank. A high standard error would
indicate a lot of variation in the difference, hence higher risk. A low
standard error would indicate little variation and less risk.
In comparisons between the "never hedge" and "always hedge" cases,
the "always hedge" case should indicate less risk. Let UP^. refer to the
unhedged position and HP^ refer to the hedged position.
(3.18) UP = MMC* - MMC
t t —n t
(3.19) HP = MMC* - MMC + FR - FR - 0.0004
t t~n t t t-n
it
where MMC^_^ = the implied forward rate at the beginning of the
hedge
MMC^ = the spot rate at the end of the hedge
FR^ ^ = the futures rate at the beginning of the hedge
FR^ - the futures rate at the end of the hedge.
The 0.0004 subtracted from HP^ refers to a round trip transaction cost of
about four basis points. UP^ is the difference between the implied
forward rate (the target rate) at time t-n and the rate the unhedged bank
pays at time t, while HP^ is the difference between the implied forward
rate at time t-n and the effective rate the hedged bank pays at time t.
The standard errors of UP and HP indicate the relative deviations from
t t
the target rate for the unhedged and hedged positions, thus indicating the
level of interest rate risk associated with each position. UP^ is
expected to have a higher standard error than HP^,
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When comparing the risk from following a selective hedging policy
with risk from following the "never hedge" and "always hedge" plans, we
would expect that the risk for the selective hedge would be soraewhere
between the two extremes. In the selective hedge case, rates are
sometimes hedged (risk is lowered) and sometimes not (risk remains high).
The selective hedge position would be represented by the difference
between the target rate and the rate resulting from using the decision
rules:
(3,20) RP « MMC* - R
t t-n t
The purpose of the selective hedging policy is to allow the bank to reduce
the risk of rates increasing while taking advantage of the situations when
rates are decreasing. Therefore, it is acceptable for the bank (even
preferable) to have a high standard error when rates are lower than
expected. The bank would prefer to maintain a low standard error when
rates are higher than expected. By dividing the observations into two
groups, one where the actual rates are lower than the target rates (RP^>0)
and one where the actual rates are higher than the target rates (RP^<0),
we can examine the risk associated with each case.
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The empirical analysis in this study consists of an examination of
how a selective hedging strategy would affect an agricultural bank's
effective MMC rates and its exposure to interest rate risk. Hedges of 3-
raonth and 6-month MMCs are considered in this model.
The Hedge Ratio
The naive hedge ratio of 1, rather than an optimal hedge ratio
(defined in Chapter III), is used throughout this study. Optimal hedge
ratios are not used because those determined in previous studies were
close enough to one to make them impractical for use by agricultural
banks. The ratios determined by Overdahl (1984) for cross-hedges between
3
CDs and T-bill futures ranged between 0.84 and 1.01. Since fractions of
futures contracts cannot be traded, some quantity of contracts greater
than one would have to be bought or sold in order to use the optimal hedge
ratio. Take, for example, the optimal hedge ratio of 0.84. A hedger
would have to plan to sell at least 4 contracts under the naive hedge in
order to use the optimal hedge ratio;
4 contracts (naive hedge) X 0.84 = 3.36 contracts (optimal hedge)
" 3 contracts
Four contracts in T-bill futures represent $2 million at the Mid-Am and $4
million at the IMM. Therefore, an agricultural bank would have to plan to
3
Overdahl (1984) determined optimal hedge ratios of 1.01, 1.00 and
0.84 for cross hedges of 3-month CDs and T-bill futures placed 3, 4 and 5
months prior to the contract month, respectively (Overdahl, 1984, p. 50).
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offer at least $2 million in MMCs at one particular time in order to use
an optimal hedge ratio. It is doubtful that a typical agricultural bank
would feel the need to hedge a position that large at any one particular
time. On an added note, Senchack and Easterwood (1983) found the benefits
of an optimal hedge over the naive hedge to be minimal for cross-hedges
between T-bill futures and 3-raonth and 6-month CDs (Senchack and
Easterwood, 1963, p. A38).
Data
Cross-hedges of 3-raonth and 6-month MMCs with T-bill futures are
examined for this study. CD rates are used in place of MMC rates because
CD rate data is more readily available. The similarities in rate
movements of CDs and MMCs supports this substitution. The T-bill rates
are secondary market rates obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Table 1.35 (or 1.36). The CD rates are weekly averages of daily secondary
market rates obtained from the Bank of America. The T-bill futures prices
are weekly averages of daily data obtained from tapes provided by the
International Monetary Market. Weekly averages from April, 1981 to
December, 1984 are used for this model.
Since the CD rates are quoted on a bond equivalent basis, they have
to be converted to a bank discount yield in order to coincide with the
futures data. The following transformation, as defined by Overdahl
(1984), is used to convert the CD rates:
(4.1) Annualized Spot Discount Rate = 360i/[365 + it ]
sm
where i « the bond equivalent yield
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t = the time from settlement to maturity (in days).
sm
In this model, 13~week and 26-week hedges are examined. The target
rates (the rate to be hedged) are the 3-month and 6-month implied forward
spot rates, which are based on the formula described by Senchack and
Easterwood (1983).
(4.2a) ,MMct , = [6 MMC. ^ - 3 MMC, ^]/3
j Jit -^»t
(4.2b) ,MMC* ^ = [12 MMC,- , - 6 MMC, ]/6
O 0,t l^,t D,t
where MMC_ = three-month CD spot rate at time t.
j, t
MMC- ^ = six-month CD spot rate at time t
D,t
MMC = one-year CD spot rate at time t.
Lift
T-bill futures are used to hedge future offerings of three-month MMCs.
The hypothesis of this model is founded on the assumption that banks
base their decisions of whether or not to hedge on a forecast of future
interest rates. If they expect rates to increase, they hedge; if they
expect rates to decrease, they don't hedge. Two different sets of
forecast data are tested in the model. One set is simply the T-bill
futures rates on the deferred contracts. Assuming that the rates on the
deferred contracts provide the market's predictions of which direction the
rates will move in the next three or six months, the bank will hedge if
the deferred contract rate is greater than the implied forward rate for
90-day T-bills, and it will not hedge if the opposite is the case. The
other set of predictions used in this model consists of quarterly
forecasts, provided by the American Statistical Institute (ASI), of 90-day
T-bill rates. If the ASI forecast is greater than the implied forward
34
rate for 90-day T-bills, then the bank will hedge; if the ASI forecast is
less than the implied foreward rate for 90-day T-bills, it will choose not
to hedge.
Accuracy of the Forecasts
When using a forecast of any kind, allowances must be made for
margins of error. Therefore, it becomes necessary to test the success of
the forecasts. For both forecasts used in this model, a new statistic,
POWER, is formulated by subtracting the predicted changes in T-bill rates
from the actual changes in MMC rates:
* > * \
(4.3) POWERA. = (MMC. - .MMC. , .) - (FR^ . - .IB. . .)
1 i,t 1 i,t-i t-i 1 ijt-i
* *
(4.4) POWERB. « (MMC. - .MMC. ^ .) - (ASI. ^ . - .TB. ^ .)
1 i,t 1 i,t-L i,t-i 1 ijt-i
where i =* 3, 6
MMC. = bank discount equivalent of i-month CD rates at time
i,t
t, the end of the hedge
★
.MMC. . = the estimated implied i-raonth CD spot rate at time
1 i,t-i
t-i, the beginning of the hedge
.IB. ^ . = the estimated implied i-month T-bill spot rate at time
I i,t-i ^
t-i
FR. . = the T-bill futures rate of the i-month deferred
i,t-i
contract at time t-i
ASI. . = the ASI prediction for time t, made at time t-i.
i,t-i
POWERA and POWERB indicate the strength of the forecasts in predicting MMC
rates over the hedging period. A POWER statistic equal to zero would
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imply that the predicted change in T-bill rates would exactly equal Che
actual change in MMC rates. By itself, a mean of POWER different from
zero would not pose a problem with the predictions. The banks can simply
adjust their decisions to reflect the error. A large standard error,
however, would weaken the strength of the predictions.
Each POWER statistic is determined two different ways. One way is to
simply group all the observations together. The other way is to divide
Che data into three groups:
Group 1 : March, June, September and December;
Group 2 : February, May, August and November;
Group 3 ; June, April, July and October.
Group 1 consists of observations made during the futures contract months,
so that predictions based on futures prices will be based on contracts due
three month hence. Those months are each the third month of their
particular quarter, so that the AS! predictions in this group will all
pertain to the last month of the quarter. Likewise, Group 2 consists of
observations made one month previous to futures contract months and during
the second month of the quarter; and Group 3 consists of observations two
months prior Co the contract months and during the first month of the
quarter. The purpose of this grouping according to months is to Cry to
take into account differences in the standard error caused by the fact
that, in both cases, essentially quarterly data is used for weekly
predictions. The standard error would be likely to change over time
within the quarter, and the separate groupings is an aCCerapt Co arrange
the observations according to the time at which they occurred during the
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quarter. Of course, using separate groups such as this does mean a
reduced number of observations for each, thereby lowering the degrees of
freedom.
It would be unrealistic to assume that a bank would estimate POWER
once and use the same estimate ad infinitum. It is more likely that it
would re-estimate POWER regularly, as more data on interest rate
predictions and their actual rates became available. In this model, POWER
is re—estimated every quarter, the first estimation occuring after 66
weeks and the last one occuring after 157 weeks. The summary statistics
for POWER are given in Tables 4.1-4.8.
Three-month hedges
For the three-month hedges, the standard error of POWERA (futures
predictions) is consistently higher than that of POWERB (ASI predictions).
This is true for the case when the data for all the months is pooled
together (Table 4.1) and the cases when the months are separated into the
three groups (Tables 4.2-4.4). For example, in Table 4.1, 1984, 3rd
quarter, the standard errors of POWERA and POWERB are 0.00152 and 0.0007,
respectively. This suggests that the ASI predictions will do a better job
of forecasting MMC rate changes than the futures market will and that they
will probably provide better results to a bank following a selective hedge
strategy.
The standard errors for the cases when the months are pooled together
are usually lower than those for the cases when the months are separated
into the three groups. For example, the standard errors of POWERA, 1984,
3rd quarter for the three groups of months are 0.00096, 0.00112, and
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0.00149, respectively (Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). This compares with a
value of 0.00071 for the pooled case. The higher standard errors for the
separated cases may be due to the decreased number of observations which
resulted from separating the data. The higher standard errors for the
separate groups of months suggest that, for this many observations, the
pooled data provides a better estimation of POWER than the separated data.
Therefore, separating the data into the three groups is not expected to
improve Che results of this study.
Six-month hedges
The standard errors for POWERA and POWERS tend to be higher for the
6-month hedges than they are for the 3-month hedges, particularly in the
case when all the months are pooled together. For example, in Table 4.5,
1984, 3rd quarter, POWERA and POWERB have standard errors of 0.00170 and
0.00123, respectively. These are higher than the standard errors in the
same cases for the three-month hedges. These numbers suggest that the
futures market and the ASI do a better job projecting rates over one
quarter than they do over two quarters. Therefore, it can be expected
that the results from the selective hedging strategy for a 6-month hedge
will be inferior to those for a 3-month hedge.
The differences between the standard errors of POWERA and POWERB are
not as large, in relative terms, in the 6-month case as they are in the 3-
month case. In some cases early in the testing period, the standard error
of POWERA is actually less than that of POWERB. This suggests that the
ASI predictions do not exhibit as much superiority over the futures
46
predictions in Che 6--month case as they do in the 3-raonCh case. Thus, the
results using the ASI predictions might be closer to the ones using the
futures prediccions in the 6-inonth case than they are in the 3-njonCh
case.
As in the case of the 3-month hedges, the standard errors for POWER
for 6-raonCh hedges tend Co be greacer when the months are separated into
the three groups than when they are pooled together. Therefore,
separating the data into the three groups is not expected to improve the
results for the 6-monCh selective hedging strategy.
Setting Up Decision Rules
By creating confidence intervals around POWER, we can predict, with
some degree of accuracy, whether rates will move up or down significantly.
The confidence intervals have the form
(4.5) X < POWER < X.
Letting AC denote "actual change" and PC denote "predicted change,"
POWER=AC-PC. We can rewrite the interval as
(4.6) X < AC-PC < X.
Taking Che left inequality and rearranging, we get
(4.7) X + PC < AC.
If we assume that 2^+PC>0, then we know that AOO. Having an actual change
greater than zero means that the bank should hedge. Therefore, the bank
would hedge if X+POO, or PO-X. Taking the right inequality and
rearranging, we get
(4.8) AC < X + PC.
kl
If X+PC<0, then AC<0. A negative change in interest rates would tell the
bank not to hedge. Therefore, the bank does not hedge if X+PC<0, or
PC<-X.
Let us assume that a bank is more adverse to having rates increase
and not being hedged than it is to having them decrease and being hedged
into higher rates. The bank prefers to run the risk of hedging when it
should not, rather than not hedging when it should. We can set up a one
sided confidence interval, using only an upper bound to limit the bank's
risk of not hedging when it should. The bank follows this decision rule:
If PC < -X, then don't hedge;
If PC > -X, then hedge.
For each estimate of POWER, two one-sided confidence intervals are
constructed, one with 95% confidence and one with 99% confidence
(Tables 4.9-4.16).
Two-sided confidence intervals are also constructed for this model.
However, it is not clear what the bank should do if no significant change
is predicted, that is, if the predicted change falls between -X and
If rates do not change, it should not matter whether banks lock in current
rates or not. Hedging does incur transaction costs of about four basis
points per round trip, but this cost is minimal. An attempt is made to
determine whether there are any significant differences between the
decisions to hedge all, half or none of the risk when no significant
change is predicted. In this scenario the bank follows this decision
rule:
If PC < -X, then don't hedge;
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If -X < PC < -X, then hedge all/half/none of the risk exposure;
If PC > -X, then hedge all of the risk exposure.
For each estimate of power, two two-sided confidence intervals are also
constructed, one with 95% confidence and one with 99% confidence
(Tables 4.9-4.16).
Determining and Comparing Results
The purpose of this study is to determine whether banks can reduce
their effective MMC rates, on the average, by using any of the decision
rules identified. Furthermore, given that they are able to lower their
MMC rates, are they able to reduce risk exposure as much as when they
hedge all the time?
Rate reduction
In order to determine whether the bank effectively reduces its MMC
rates by following any of the selective hedging strategies, RU^ and RH^
(defined in Chapter III) are determined. The summary stastistics for RU^
and RH^ are given in Tables 4.17-4.24.
For RU^, the decision rules based on the futures market predictions
yield significant positive mean values for both the 3-month hedge and the
6-month hedge. This means that, on the average, a bank pays higher MMC
rates by following one of these decision rules than it would pay if it did
not hedge at all. Some of the decision rules based on the ASI predictions
yield significant negative values of RU^ in the 3-month hedge. For
example, the decision rules based on the two-sided confidence intervals
(CIs) where the position is not hedged if rates are expected to change
yield values of -0.00125 for the 95% CI and -0.00137 for the 99% CI
T
ab
le
A
.1
7
.
S
um
m
ar
y
s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
fo
r
3
^
o
n
th
h
ed
g
e;
d
e
c
is
io
n
ru
le
s
b
as
ed
on
a
ll
m
o
n
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
E
U
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
tu
r
e
s
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
0
.0
0
1
6
7
0
.0
0
0
5
7
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
0
,0
0
2
4
7
0
.0
0
0
6
7
A
ll
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
9
9
%
C
l,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
0
.0
0
1
2
9
0
.0
0
0
3
9
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
0
.0
0
2
2
8
0
.0
0
0
5
7
A
ll
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
A
S
I
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
2
8
0
.0
0
0
5
9
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
1
2
5
0
.0
0
0
4
9
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
7
1
0
.0
0
0
5
2
A
l
l
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
1
6
0
.0
0
0
6
0
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
6
1
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-0
,0
0
1
3
7
0
.0
0
0
4
7
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
6
6
0
.0
0
0
5
2
A
l
l
1
0
4
0
.0
0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
6
2
Ta
bl
e
4.
18
,
Su
mm
ary
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
RU
^.:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
se
pa
ra
te
d
In
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
0
.0
0
1
2
0
0
.0
0
2
2
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
4
2
0
.0
0
0
5
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
9
9
X
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
9
4
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
0
.0
0
0
8
9
0
.0
0
2
0
9
0
.0
0
3
2
8
0
.0
0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
0
5
5
0
.0
0
0
9
4
A
S
I
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
4
9
0
.0
0
0
5
8
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
9
6
-
0
.0
0
0
7
3
-
0
.0
0
0
4
9
0
.0
0
0
4
9
0
.0
0
0
5
1
0
.0
0
0
5
8
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
0
6
2
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
1
0
5
-
0
.0
0
0
5
1
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
4
8
0
.0
0
0
5
2
0
.0
0
0
6
3
C
n
0
0
T
a
b
le
4
.1
9
.
S
u
m
m
a
ry
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
fo
r
R
U
:
6
-m
o
n
th
h
e
d
g
e
;
d
e
c
is
io
n
r
u
l
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
l
l
m
o
n
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r
U
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
95
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
4
0
2
0
.0
0
1
1
4
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
0
,0
0
0
7
5
0
.0
0
0
3
4
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
2
2
5
0
.0
0
0
6
6
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
3
7
4
0
.0
0
1
2
1
99
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
2
8
5
0
.0
0
1
2
8
N
o
n
e
9
1
0
.0
0
0
6
3
0
.0
0
0
3
2
99
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
1
6
3
0
.0
0
0
7
0
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
2
6
3
0
.0
0
1
2
9
A
S
I
95
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
7
1
0
.0
0
0
9
1
P
r
e
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
1
3
0
.0
0
0
4
7
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
0
6
2
A
ll
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
5
8
0
.0
0
0
9
2
99
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
1
0
1
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
4
7
99
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
6
5
A
l
l
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
1
0
1
U
i
v
O
T
a
b
le
4
.2
0
.
S
u
m
m
ar
y
s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
fo
r
R
U
^:
6
-m
o
n
th
h
e
d
g
e
;
d
e
c
is
io
n
r
u
l
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
m
o
n
th
s
s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
ld
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
95
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
3
7
0
0
.0
0
1
2
4
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
0
.0
0
0
7
6
0
.0
0
0
3
4
95
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
1
9
8
0
.0
0
0
7
0
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
3
1
9
0
.0
0
1
2
7
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
2
6
7
0
.0
0
1
3
1
N
o
n
e
9
1
0
.0
0
0
7
6
0
.0
0
0
3
4
99
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
1
6
4
0
.0
0
0
7
2
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
2
5
2
0
.0
0
1
3
3
A
S
I
95
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
1
1
1
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
5
9
0
.0
0
0
5
0
95
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
0
7
3
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
1
0
8
0
.0
0
1
1
7
99
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
1
1
7
0
.0
0
1
1
7
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
3
8
0
.0
0
0
4
9
99
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
0
.0
0
5
7
8
0
.0
0
0
7
3
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
1
5
3
0
.0
0
1
1
9
o
T
ab
le
4.
21
.
Su
nu
na
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RU
^:
3-
iD
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
a
ll
m
on
th
s
po
ol
ed
to
g
e
th
e
r
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
0
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
1
6
1
0
.0
0
1
1
7
9
5
%
e
x
.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
0
8
1
0
.0
0
0
3
9
A
l
l
1
0
4
0
0
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
0
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
1
9
9
0
.0
0
0
8
8
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
1
0
0
0
.0
0
0
4
4
A
ll
1
0
4
0
0
A
S
I
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
5
6
0
.0
0
0
7
2
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
4
5
3
0
.0
0
0
7
4
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
9
9
0
.0
0
0
7
1
A
ll
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
4
4
0
.0
0
0
7
2
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
3
6
0
.0
0
0
7
2
N
o
n
e
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
4
6
5
0
.0
0
0
7
4
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
1
0
4
-0
.0
0
3
9
4
0
.0
0
0
7
0
A
l
l
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
2
3
0
.0
0
0
7
1
T
ab
le
4.
22
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RH
^.:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
se
pa
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
si
ti
o
n
H
ed
ge
d
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
0
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
2
0
8
-
0
.0
0
1
0
4
0
0
.0
0
0
8
7
0
.0
0
0
4
4
0
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
0
0
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
2
3
9
-
0
.0
0
1
2
0
0
0
.0
0
0
9
0
0
.0
0
0
4
5
0
A
S
I
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
%
C
l,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
7
7
0
.0
0
0
7
2
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
4
2
4
-
0
.0
0
4
0
1
-
0
.0
0
3
7
7
0
.0
0
0
7
6
0
.0
0
0
7
2
0
.0
0
0
7
2
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
3
4
2
0
.0
0
0
7
1
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
4
-
0
.0
0
4
3
3
-
0
.0
0
3
7
9
-
0
.0
0
3
2
5
0
.0
0
0
7
6
0
.0
0
0
7
1
0
.0
0
0
7
0
O
N
N
3
T
ab
le
4.
23
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RH
^:
6-
*m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
a
ll
m
on
th
s
po
ol
ed
to
g
e
th
e
r
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
tu
r
e
s
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
9
i
O
.O
O
lU
0
.0
0
0
6
5
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
1
2
0
.0
0
1
3
2
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
6
3
0
.0
0
0
8
1
A
l
l
9
1
0
,0
0
0
8
6
0
.0
0
0
5
3
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
4
3
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
2
4
0
.0
0
1
3
2
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
1
2
4
0
.0
0
0
7
5
A
ll
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
2
5
0
.0
0
0
4
1
A
S
I
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
5
8
0
.0
0
0
9
6
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
0
0
0
.0
0
1
2
6
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
2
3
0
.0
0
1
0
5
A
l
l
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
4
5
0
.0
0
0
9
6
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
9
3
0
.0
0
0
8
9
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
8
8
0
.0
0
1
2
7
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
9
0
0
.0
0
1
0
0
A
l
l
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
9
3
0
.0
0
0
8
9
U
)
T
a
b
le
4
,2
4
.
S
u
n
u
n
ar
y
s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
fo
r
R
H
:
6
-i
3
io
n
th
h
e
d
g
e
;
d
e
c
is
io
n
r
u
l
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
m
o
n
th
s
s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
E
U
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
F
u
t
u
r
e
s
95
%
C
l,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
0
.0
0
0
8
2
0
.0
0
0
4
7
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
1
2
0
.0
0
1
3
2
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
9
0
0
.0
0
0
7
5
A
l
l
9
1
0
.0
0
0
3
2
0
.0
0
0
4
1
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
0
3
2
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
1
2
0
,0
0
1
3
2
99
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
l
f
9
1
-
0
.0
0
1
2
4
0
.0
0
0
7
0
A
l
l
9
1
-
0
.0
0
0
3
6
0
.0
0
0
2
8
A
S
I
95
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
1
8
0
.0
0
0
7
9
P
r
e
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
4
7
0
.0
0
1
2
3
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
6
4
0
.0
0
0
8
6
A
ll
9
1
-
0
.0
0
1
8
0
0
.0
0
0
7
0
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
1
-
0
.0
0
1
7
0
0
.0
0
0
7
0
N
o
n
e
9
1
-
0
.0
0
3
2
5
0
.0
0
1
2
5
99
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
9
1
-
0
.0
0
2
3
0
0
.0
0
0
8
4
A
ll
9
1
-
0
.0
0
1
3
4
0
.0
0
0
6
7
c
^
65
(Table 4.17). Therefore, a bank following either one of these decision
rules is faced with MMC rates which average 12.5 or 13.7 basis points
below the rates it would face if it did not hedge at all. For the 6-raonth
hedge, the decision rules based on the ASI predictions yield insignificant
values for suggesting that a bank following one of these decision
rules pays rate on MMCs which are not different, on the average, from the
unhedged rates.
For some of the decision rules based on the futures market
predictions yield significant negative mean values for both the 3-Tnonth
and 6-month hedges. These decision rules are based on the two-sided CIs
where either none or half of the position is hedged if rates are expected
to change. For the other decision rules based on futures preditions, RH^
has means and standard errors of zero for the 3-month hedge and
insignificant means for the 6-month hedge. These decision rules are based
on one-sided CIs and two-sided CIs where the entire position is hedged if
rates are not expected to change.
All of the decision rules based on the ASI predictions yield
significant negative values for RH^ for both the 3-month and the 6-raonth
hedges. In all instances, the ASI decision rules show improvement over
the futures market decision rules. For the 3-month hedge, the best
results occur for the decision rules based on the two-sided CIs where the
position is not hedged if rates are not expected to change. The mean
values of RH^ are -0.00453 for the 95% case and -0.00465 for the 99% case
(Table 4.21). Thus, a bank following either of these decision rules pays,
on the average, 45.3 or 46.5 basis points less on MMCs than it would pay
66
if it hedged all of the time. For the 6-month hedge, the best results
occur for the decision rules based on the one-sided CIs or the two-sided
CIs where the entire position is hedged when rates are not expected
to change. The mean value of RH^ is -0.00358 for the 95% one-sided case
and -0.00293 for the 99% one-sided case (Table 4.23). Thus, a bank
following these decision rules for a 6-raonth hedge pays, on the average,
35.8 or 29.3 basis points less on MMCs than it would pay if it hedged all
of the time.
Separating the data into the three groups of months to determine the
boundaries of the decision rules does occasionally offer some improvement
in the results for the model, but these improvements are not very
consistent. For the futures market predictions, the separated data does
produce lower mean values of RH^ for both the 3-month and 6-month hedges.
However, the best results overall for RH^ occur with the ASI predictions
and the pooled data. For the 3-month hedge, the 99% 2-sided CI decision
rule where none of the position is hedged if rates are expected to change
results in a RH^ mean value of -0.00465 for the pooled data and -0.00433
for the separated data (Tables 4.21 and 4.22). For the 6-month hedge, the
95% one-sided CI decision rules results in a RH^ mean of -0.00358 for the
pooled data and -0.00218 for the separated data (Tables 4.23 and 4.24).
For RU^, the decision rules based on the separated data produce results
which are either similar or inferior to those produced by the decision
rules based on the pooled data. Thus, separating the data to determine
the boundaries of the decision rules does not appear to produce any
substantial benefits to the model.
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For the decision rules based on the two-sided confidence intervals,
the choice of how to act if interest rates are not expected to change has
some impact on the results. For the most part, the two-sided CI decision
rules result in means of RU^ and RH^ that are lower when the position is
not hedged when rates are not expected to change than when the position is
hedged under the same circumstances. This may be due to transaction
costs, which amount to four basis points per hedge. These costs
automatically make hedging more expensive than not hedging when rates do
not change. Also, if interest rates are trending downward during the
testing period, the unhedged position will tend to offer lower rates than
the hedged position. Thus, at least for the time frame tested in this
model, it seems that a strategy which discourages hedging is going to
result in lower MMC rates than one which encourages hedging.
There are some cases where the two-sided CI decision rules result in
means of RU^ and RH^ that are lower when the position is hedged if rates
are not expected to change than when the position is not hedged under the
same circumstances. For the 6-month hedge, all months pooled together,
ASI predictions, both the 95% and 99% two-sided CI decision rules show the
means of RU^ and RH^ decreasing as a larger portion of the position is
hedged when rates are not expected to change (Tables 4.19 and 4.23).
Thus, for the 6-month hedge, pooled data, ASI predictions, it seems that a
strategy which encourages hedging produces better results than one which
discourages hedging, at least for the time frame tested in this model.
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Analysis of risk
In order to determine whether risk reduction is preserved by
following a selective hedging strategy, the standard errors of HP^
and RPj. (defined in Chapter III) are examined.
We begin by looking at UP , the unhedged position, and HP , the
hedged position. The summary statistics are given in Table 4.25. For the
3-month hedge, the standard error of the hedged position is 0.00028,
compared with 0.00100 for the unhedged position. Therefore, by cross-
hedging its 3-month MMCs with T-bill futures, a bank can reduce its
exposure to interest rate risk to less than one-third of its unhedged
risk. For the 6-month hedge, the hedged position has a standard error of
0.00051, compared to 0.00136 for the unhedged position. Thus, the bank is
able to reduce its exposure to interest rate risk on 6-month MMCs to a
little more than a third of its unhedged risk.
It is expected that the risk for the decision model falls somewhere
between the two extremes of risk associated with the hedged position and
the unhedged position. The standard error of RP^. over the entire data set
gives an indication of the risk the bank faces by following the decision
rules. The results are given in Tables 4.26-4.29. For the 3-month
hedges/ASI predictions, the standard errors of RP^ are around 0.0008,
which is closer to the unhedged position than the hedged position. For
the 6-month hedges/ASI predictions, RP^ has standard errors ranging from
0.00085 (which is closer to the hedged position than it is to the unhedged
position) to 0.00131 (which is very close to the unhedged position). The
results for the futures predictions are more erratic. For the 3-month
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hedge, RP^ has standard errors ranging from 0.00028 for the decision rules
which tend to encourage hedging to 0.00098 for those which discourage
hedging. The 0.00028 value is identical to the hedged position, while the
0.00098 is only slightly better than the unhedged position. For the 6-
month hedge, RP^ has standard errors ranging between 0.00059 for the
decision rules which encourage hedging to 0.00134 for those which
discourage hedging. As in the 3-raonth hedge, the former value is very
close to the hedged position, while the latter is very close to the
unhedged pos it ion.
Of course, as stated in Chapter III, the goal of the selective hedge
is to allow the banks to reduce the risk of rates increasing while taking
advantage of the situations when rates are decreasing. Therefore, it is
acceptable to the bank (even preferable) to have a high standard error
when rates are lower than the target. The banks would prefer to maintain
a low standard error when rates are higher than the target. Dividing the
observations into two groups, one where the actual rates are lower than
the target rates (RP^>0) and one where the actual rates are higher than
the target rates (RP^<0), gives an indication of the risk associated with
each case (Tables 4.30-4.37).
For the cases when the actual realized rate is lower than the target
rate (RP^>0), high standard errors of RP^ are desired because they
represent volatility (in the form of MMC rates dropping) which is
favorable to the bank. For the 3~month hedge, all months pooled together,
the standard errors of RP^>0 range from 0.00020 to 0.00146 for the futures
predictions and from 0.00121 to 0.00180 for the ASI prediction, depending
T
ab
le
4.
30
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^.
<
0:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
es
;
d
ec
is
io
n
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
m
o
n
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r;
fu
tu
re
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
o
n
a
l
l
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
RP
^
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
3
0
2
5
1
2
0
.0
0
9
0
8
0
.0
0
4
5
3
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
1
4
6
0
.0
0
0
8
5
0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
9
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
l
f
A
l
l
3
6
2
9
1
2
0
.0
0
9
2
6
0
.0
0
4
7
5
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
1
3
3
0
.0
0
0
7
9
0
.0
0
0
2
0
RP
j.
<
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
2
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
7
4
7
9
9
2
-
0
.0
0
6
5
6
-
0
.0
0
5
1
9
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
5
0
0
.0
0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
9
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
2
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
8
7
5
9
2
-
0
.0
0
7
4
6
-
0
.0
0
5
5
3
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
5
5
0
.0
0
0
3
6
0
.0
0
0
2
7
•
v
j
O
i
T
a
b
le
4
.3
1
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
RP
.
>
0,
RP
^
<
0:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
es
;
de
ci
si
on
m
on
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r;
A
S
!
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
r
u
l
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
l
l
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
si
ti
o
n
H
ed
ge
d
W
he
n
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
at
es
N
ot
E
x
p
ec
te
d
to
C
ha
ng
e
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
R
u
le
(2
-S
ld
e
d
C
IS
O
n
ly
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
E
r
r
o
r
RP
j.
>
0
9
5
%
C
I»
O
n
e
-S
ld
e
d
2
8
0
.0
1
1
1
8
0
.0
0
1
6
1
9
5
%
N
o
n
e
4
0
0
.0
0
9
2
2
0
.0
0
1
2
4
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
H
a
lf
3
5
0
.0
0
9
0
6
0
.0
0
1
4
6
A
l
l
2
7
0
.0
1
1
2
4
0
.0
0
1
6
7
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
2
6
0
.0
1
1
4
1
0
.0
0
1
7
3
9
9
%
N
o
n
e
4
1
0
.0
0
9
1
6
0
.0
0
1
2
1
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
H
a
lf
3
6
0
.0
0
8
5
6
0
.0
0
1
4
5
A
l
l
2
5
0
.0
1
1
5
0
0
.0
0
1
8
0
RP
^.
<
0
so
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
6
-
0
.0
0
4
2
7
0
.0
0
0
2
8
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
6
4
-
0
.0
0
4
3
5
0
.0
0
0
3
2
H
a
lf
6
9
-
0
.0
0
4
1
1
0
.0
0
0
3
1
A
ll
7
7
-
0
.0
0
4
2
4
0
.0
0
0
2
8
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
8
-
0
.0
0
4
2
2
0
.0
0
0
2
8
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
6
3
-
0
.0
0
4
3
3
0
.0
0
0
3
3
H
a
lf
6
8
-
0
.0
0
4
1
1
0
.0
0
0
3
2
A
ll
7
9
-
0
.0
0
4
2
1
0
.0
0
0
2
8
o
^
T
ab
le
4.
32
,
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^.
<
0:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
;
fu
tu
re
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
a
n
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
IS
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
RP
j.
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
3
7
2
6
1
2
0
.0
0
8
2
9
0
.0
0
4
5
1
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
1
3
0
0
.0
0
0
8
7
0
,0
0
0
2
0
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
3
9
2
7
1
2
0
.0
0
8
5
9
0
.0
0
4
7
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
0
.0
0
1
2
4
0
.0
0
0
8
5
0
.0
0
0
2
0
RP
j.
<
0
9
5
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
2
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
7
7
8
9
2
-
0
.0
0
7
0
4
-
0
.0
0
5
0
0
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
5
6
0
.0
0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
9
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
ld
e
d
9
2
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
2
7
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
5
7
7
9
2
-
0
.0
0
7
1
9
-
0
.0
0
4
9
9
-
0
.0
0
4
2
3
0
.0
0
0
5
9
0
.0
0
0
3
6
0
.0
0
0
2
7
T
ab
le
4,
33
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^
<
0:
3-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
;
A
S
I
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
RP
j.
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
3
1
0
.0
1
0
1
9
0
.0
0
1
5
1
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
4
0
3
7
3
1
0
.0
0
8
9
4
0
.0
0
8
8
4
0
,0
1
0
1
9
0
.0
0
1
2
6
0
,0
0
1
3
7
0
.0
0
1
5
1
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
2
8
0
.0
1
0
5
3
0
.0
0
1
6
5
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
4
1
3
6
2
6
0
.0
0
8
8
5
0
.0
0
8
4
8
0
.0
1
0
9
5
0
.0
0
1
2
4
0
.0
0
1
4
3
0
.0
0
1
7
4
R
P
t
<
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
3
-
0
.0
0
4
1
7
0
.0
0
0
2
9
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
4
6
7
7
3
-
0
.0
0
4
6
5
-
0
.0
0
4
3
5
-
0
.0
0
4
1
7
0
.0
0
0
3
3
0
.0
0
0
3
0
0
.0
0
0
2
9
9
9
%
C
l,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
6
-
0
.0
0
4
2
2
0
,0
0
0
2
8
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
3
6
8
7
8
-
0
.0
0
4
6
6
-
0
.0
0
4
3
0
-
0
.0
0
4
2
0
0
.0
0
0
3
6
0
.0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
2
8
•
v
j
0
0
T
ab
le
4.
34
,
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^.
<
0:
6-
m
on
th
he
dg
es
;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
a
ll
m
o
n
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r;
fu
tu
re
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
R
P
t
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
5
0
.0
0
3
8
6
0
.0
0
0
6
6
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
5
2
3
1
3
0
.0
1
1
6
7
0
.0
0
5
2
9
0
.0
0
3
7
5
0
.0
0
2
0
6
0
.0
0
0
8
3
0
.0
0
0
7
5
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
4
0
.0
0
3
6
2
0
.0
0
0
7
1
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
6
2
4
1
4
0
.0
1
1
5
2
0
.0
0
5
1
6
0
.0
0
3
6
2
0
.0
0
1
9
8
0
.0
0
0
8
0
0
.0
0
0
7
1
R
P
,
<
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
—
S
id
e
d
7
6
-
0
.0
1
0
1
6
0
.0
0
0
7
3
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
ll
6
6
6
8
7
8
-
0
.0
1
0
7
4
-
0
.0
0
9
9
2
-
0
.0
0
9
4
6
0
.0
0
0
8
3
0
.0
0
0
7
4
0
.0
0
0
6
8
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
7
7
-
0
.0
0
8
5
5
0
.0
0
0
6
1
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
5
6
7
7
7
-
0
.0
1
0
8
5
-
0
.0
0
9
2
7
-
0
.0
0
8
2
9
0
.0
0
0
8
3
0
.0
0
0
6
7
0
.0
0
0
5
9
•>
4
T
a
b
le
4
.3
5
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^.
<
0:
6-
m
on
th
he
dg
es
;
de
ci
si
on
m
o
n
th
s
p
o
o
le
d
to
g
e
th
e
r;
A
S
I
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
r
u
l
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
l
l
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
a
n
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
RP
(.
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
2
3
0
.0
1
0
3
2
0
.0
0
2
3
0
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
7
2
6
2
1
0
.0
1
1
9
3
0
.0
0
9
6
1
0
.0
1
0
8
8
0
.0
0
1
9
1
0
.0
0
2
0
7
0
.0
0
2
4
8
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
9
0
.0
1
0
0
9
0
.0
0
2
6
4
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
7
2
6
1
9
0
.0
1
1
9
3
0
.0
0
8
6
8
0
.0
1
0
0
9
0
.0
0
1
9
1
0
.0
0
1
9
9
0
.0
0
2
6
4
RP
,.
<
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
6
8
-
0
.0
0
7
6
7
0
.0
0
0
5
8
95
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
4
6
5
7
0
-
0
.0
1
0
3
0
-
0
.0
0
8
7
1
-
0
.0
0
7
4
9
0
.0
0
0
7
2
0
.0
0
0
6
0
0
.0
0
0
5
8
99
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
2
-
0
.0
0
7
4
4
0
.0
0
0
5
7
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
l
f
A
ll
6
4
6
5
7
2
-
0
.0
1
0
4
7
-
0
.0
0
8
8
0
-
0
.0
0
7
4
4
0
.0
0
0
7
1
0
.0
0
0
6
0
0
.0
0
0
5
7
0
0
o
T
ab
le
4.
36
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^
>
0,
RP
^
<
0:
6-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
se
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s;
fu
tu
re
s
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
IS
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
R
Pt
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
9
0
.0
0
3
7
1
0
.0
0
1
0
2
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
5
2
0 9
0
.0
1
1
4
3
0
.0
0
5
1
3
0
.0
0
3
7
1
0
.0
0
2
0
9
0
.0
0
0
9
9
0
.0
0
1
0
2
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
0
0
.0
0
3
5
2
0
.0
0
0
9
3
9
9
%
G
I»
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
l
f
A
ll
2
5
2
0
1
0
0
.0
1
1
4
3
0
.0
0
5
1
3
0
.0
0
3
5
2
0
.0
0
2
0
9
0
.0
0
0
9
9
0
.0
0
0
9
3
RP
^
<
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e—
S
id
ed
8
2
-
0
,0
0
8
7
6
0
.0
0
0
6
2
9
5
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
l
f
A
l
l
6
6
7
1
8
2
-
0
.0
1
0
6
6
-
0
.0
0
8
8
9
-
0
,0
0
8
2
0
0
.0
0
0
8
4
0
.0
0
0
6
9
0
.0
0
0
5
9
9
9
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
8
1
-
0
,0
0
7
7
4
0
,0
0
0
5
4
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-S
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
6
7
1
8
1
-
0
,0
1
0
6
6
-
0
,0
0
8
4
5
-
0
,0
0
7
5
6
0
,0
0
0
8
4
0
.0
0
0
6
3
0
.0
0
0
5
1
C
D
T
ab
le
4.
37
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
RP
^.
>
0,
RP
^.
<
0:
6-
m
on
th
he
dg
e;
de
ci
si
on
ru
le
s
ba
se
d
on
m
on
th
s
s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
in
to
th
re
e
g
ro
u
p
s
;
A
S
I
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s
D
e
c
is
io
n
R
u
le
P
o
rt
io
n
o
f
P
o
s
it
io
n
H
ed
g
ed
W
he
n
R
a
te
s
N
o
t
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
to
C
h
an
g
e
(2
-S
id
e
d
C
Is
O
n
ly
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
RP
^
>
0
9
5
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-s
id
e
d
1
5
0
.0
1
0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
1
0
9
5
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
7
2
4
1
4
0
.0
1
1
0
7
0
.0
0
6
7
0
0
.0
0
8
8
4
0
.0
0
2
0
0
0
.0
0
1
9
0
0
.0
0
3
0
8
9
9
%
C
I,
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
1
3
0
.0
0
9
4
7
0
.0
0
3
2
6
9
9
%
C
I,
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
2
7
2
2
1
0
0
.0
1
1
0
7
0
.0
0
6
5
5
0
.0
0
9
9
5
0
.0
0
2
0
0
0
.0
0
2
0
2
0
.0
0
4
1
1
R
P
t
<
0
95
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
6
-
0
.0
0
7
3
9
0
.0
0
0
5
4
9
5
%
C
I»
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
4
6
7
7
7
-
0
.0
0
9
2
7
-
0
.0
0
7
9
3
-
0
.0
0
7
4
0
0
.0
0
0
7
8
0
.0
0
0
6
4
0
.0
0
0
5
4
9
9
%
C
I.
O
n
e
-S
id
e
d
7
8
-
0
.0
0
7
4
1
0
.0
0
0
5
3
9
9
%
C
I.
T
w
o
-s
id
e
d
N
o
n
e
H
a
lf
A
l
l
6
4
6
9
8
1
-
0
.0
0
9
5
8
-
0
.0
0
7
9
0
-
0
.0
0
7
2
5
0
.0
0
0
7
7
0
.0
0
0
6
3
0
.0
0
0
5
2
0
0
N
3
83
on the decision rules. Clearly, the standard errors for the futures
predictions are quite erratic, ranging from below the standard error of
the hedged position (0.00028) to well above the standard error of the
unhedged position (0.00100). On the other hand, the standard errors for
the ASI predictions are consistently higher than the standard error for
the unhedged position (Tables 4.30, 4.31). For the 6-inonth hedge, all
months pooled together, the standard errors of RP^>0 range from 0.00066 to
0.00206 for the futures predictions and from 0.00191 to 0.00264 for the
ASI predictions (Tables 4.34, 4.35). The standard errors for the futures
prediction are quite variable, ranging from slightly higher than 0.00051,
the standard error for the hedged position, to much higher than 0.00136,
the standard error of the unhedged position. The standard errors for the
ASI predictions are also variable, but they are all higher than the
standard error of the unhedged position. The fact that the ASI
predictions consistently maintain higher standard errors for
indicates that they do a better job than the futures predictions of
capturing favorable volatility for the bank.
For the cases when the actual, realized rate is higher than the
target rate (RP^<0), low standard errors of RP^ are desired because they
represent unfavorable volatility (in the form of MMC rates rising). For
the 3-raonth hedge, all months pooled together, the standard errors of
RP^<0 range from 0.00027 to 0.00055 for the futures predictions and from
0.00028 to 0.00033 for the ASI predictions. The standard error for the
futures predictions vary from just below to almost double the standard
error of the unhedged position (0.00028). The standard errors for ASI
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predictions are less variable than those for the futures predictions and
only slightly higher than the standard error of the hedged position. For
the 6-month hedge all months pooled together, standard errors
ranging from 0.00059 to 0.00083 for the futures predictions and from
0.00057 to 0.00072 for the ASI predictions. These values are all
consistently higher than 0.00051, the standard error of the hedged
position. For the 6-month hedge, the ASI predictions produce slightly
better results than the futures predictions, but the difference is not as
dramatic as it is in the 3-month hedge. The standard errors of RP^<0 in
this case do not compare quite as favorably to the standard error of HP^
as they do in the 3-month hedge, but they still show improvement over the
futures predictions. The fact that for the ASI predictions the standard
errors of are much closer to the standard error of HP^ than they are
to the standard error of UP^ indicates that the bank is able to preserve
its risk reduction when it follows these decision rules.
Further Analysis
Throughout the analysis, the means of RH^ are consistently lower than
the means of RU^, indicating that the selective hedging strategy shows
more improvement over the "always hedge" strategy than it does over the
"never hedge" strategy. This raises the question of whether the
predictions are biased. A downward trend in interest rates would make the
unhedged rates lower, on the average, than the hedged rates, causing the
mean of RH^ to be lower than the mean of RU^. If the predictions are not
biased towards either rate increases or decreases, then opposite trends in
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Che daCa should reverse Che relative values of RU^ and RH^. However, if
the predictions are biased, the opposite trends would not create opposite
conditions. For example, if rates trend downward from time t^ to t^ and
predictions are biased towards decreases in rates, then the results of the
selective hedge will probably yield good results. RH^ will be strongly
negative and RU^ less so. If rates are trending upwards from t^ to t^ and
predictions are still biased towards decreases, then the selective hedging
strategy will yield poor results. RU^ might not decrease very much
because Che predictions will be discouraging hedging. RH^ might be
strongly positive because the bank will not be hedging, even Chough Che
rates will be on the rise.
One way to check for any bias resulting from trends in the data might
be to reverse the data and add it to the original data set, thus providing
equal portions of data trending both ways. Unfortunately, there are two
problems with using reversed data in this model. The first problem is
that the model is based on a time series of interest rate forecasts which
cannot be reversed and applied to previous time periods. For example, for
the time series t,, C-, ..., t , the forecast for each period is the
L Z n
expected rate for the next period.
(4.9) F. = .E(R. .)
1 1 1+1
where i = 1, 2, ..., n
^ECR^^j^) = the expectation at time i of the interest rate at time
i+1.
If the data is reversed and added to the existing data set, the time
series will consist of the periods t,, t_, ..., t , t , t t,.
12 n n n-1 1
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The forecasts of the second half of the time series should have the forra
(4.10) F = ^.E(R
n+i n+i n+i+1
- ,E(R .).
n-i+I n-i
This is a forecast of an event which has already occurred; it is neither
attainable nor logically sound.
The other problem with using backwards data for this model stems from
the fact that implied forward rates are used as the target rates for the
hedges. Implied forward rates are estimates of what the market says the
spot rates will be at some point in the future. They are based on the
differences between the rates of instruments along the yield curve.
Because the shape of the yield curve does not change when the data is
reversed, the implied forward rates, by definition, always refer to the
future. It would be inconsistent to apply these forward-looking rates to
backwards data.
While it is difficult to determine to what extent trends in the data
lead to biased results, the fact that some of the ASI predictions yield
significant negative values for both RH^ and RU^ is encouraging. This
means that the bank was better off by following these decision rules than
by following the "never hedge" strategy. So, even though MMC rates may
have been decreasing more than they were increasing, the bank still
benefits by hedging in some cases.
The success of the selective hedge strategy depends a great deal on
the forecast data used in the model. The results in this study are
consistently better with the ASI predictions than they are with the
futures predictions. Both sets of forecast data used in this study
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consist of quarterly predictions of 90-day T-bill rates. Better results
might be obtained if the forecasts were on a monthly, rather than
quarterly, basis and if the security which is used in the forecasts more
closely matched the securities being hedged in maturity, size and quality.
Results are better for the 3-month selective hedge than they are for the
6-month selective hedge, due, in part, to Che fact that 3—month forecasts
tend to be better than 6-month forecasts. Using forecast data that is
simply more accurate than the ASI's (if one exists) might improve the
model, but the expense of developing better forecasts has to be measured
against the reduced MMC rates that would result.
The success of the selective hedging strategy is also dependent upon
the limits of the decision rules. No theoretical basis for choosing
between the 95% or 99%, one-sided or two-sided CI decision rules is
advanced by this model. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the hedging
all, half or none of the portfolio is best if rates are not expected to
change. Any differences in the empirical results for these various
decision rules appear to be more dependent on trends in the data than on
any theoretical reason for one to be preferred over the other. Still, the
model does indicate that a selective hedging strategy can be effective at
reducing an agricultural bank's MMC rates, given decent interest rate
forecasts, without a substantial increase in risk over the "always hedge"
strategy.
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Overall view
The overall results of this study, including the means of RH^ and RU^
and the standard errors of RP^>0 and RPj.<0, are presented in Tables 4.38 -
4.41.
The results are fairly consistent for the 3-month case. For the ASI
predictions, all months pooled together, the lowest mean values for RU^
and RHj. are achieved with the two-sided CIs where none of the position is
hedged if rates are not expected to change. The mean values for RU^ and
RH^ are -0.00125 and -0.00453, respectively, for the 95% case and -0.00132
and -0.00465, respectively, for the 99% case (Table 4.38). Interestingly,
the decision rules which produce Che best results for RU^ and RH^ produce
the least desirable results for RP|.>0 and RP^<0, with RP^>0 having its
lowest standard error and RP^<0 having its highest standard error for
these cases. One would think that the decision rules which produce the
better results would do a beter job of capturing favorable volatility and
protecting against unfavorable volatility. Since the bank does not hedge
as often under these decision rules, it has fewer transaction costs. The
savings in transaction costs must outweigh the reduced rates which result
from following a more conservative decision rule.
The results the 6-month case are slightly opposite to those for the
3-Tnonth case. For the ASI predictions, all months pooled together, the
lowest mean values of RU^ and RH^ are produced by the decision rules based
on one-sided CIs, with values of -0.00071 and -0.00358, respectively, for
the 95% case and -0.00005 and -0.00293, respectively, for the 99% case
(Table 4.40). It must be pointed out that the means of RU^ are not
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significantly different from zero, suggesting that the values of RH^ carry
more weight than the values of RU^ for the 6-month case. Unlike the 3-
month case, the decision rules which produce the best means for RH^ also
produce the most desirable standard errors for RP^>0 and RP^<0. In this
case, the benefits of a more conservative decision rule must outweigh the
increased transaction costs that result from hedging more often.
What do the results that have been presented in the study mean, in
dollar terms, for an agricultural bank? The dollar effects of the
decision rules for $1 million offerings of MMCs are presented in
Tables 4.42-4.45. For the 3-month case, the dollar figures are determined
by multiplying the means of RU^ and RH^ by the dollar amount of MMCs to be
issued ($1 million) and dividing by four (since the loans are 3-months in
duration and the rates are quoted on a yearly basis). For the AST
predictions, all months pooled together, the selective hedging strategy
results in liability interest payments which are between $12.50 and
$312.50 lower than the "never hedge" strategy and between $807.50 and
$1162.50 lower than the "always hedge" strategy for every $l million in
MMCs that are issued. For the 6-raonth case, the means of RU^ and RH^ are
multiplied by the dollar amount of MMCs to be issued and divided by two
(since the loans are 3-months in duration). For the ASI predictions, all
months pooled together, the selective hedging strategy results in
liability interest payments which are between $0 and $355 lower than the
"never hedge" strategy and between $1615 and $2325 lower than the "always
hedge" strategy for every $1 million issued in MMCs. In terms of interest
rates, the selective hedging strategy shows a greater advantage over the
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'^always hedge" strategy in the 3-month case than it does in the S-month
case. However, in dollar terms, the selective hedging strategy actually
shows greater advantage over the "always hedge" in the 6-month case, due
to the longer maturity of the securities involved.
It is difficult to put the risk reduction qualities of the selective
hedging strategy into dollar terms. In this study, interest rate risk, is
measured by the standard error around the mean of the difference between
the target rate and the actual rate. However, the levels of risk
associated with the various decision rules of the selective hedging
strategy can be compared with the risk for the unhedged and hedged
positions. For the 3-month hedge, the risk of the actual MMC rate being
higher than the target rate (RP^<0) is roughly one-third of the unhedged
risk and about even with the hedged risk. Similar results.are also
obtained for the 6-month selective hedging strategy for certain decision
rules.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate that there is an opportunity for
agricultural banks to lower their MMC rates by using a selective hedging
strategy. Of the two sets of forecast data used in this study, the ASI
predictions yield consistently better results than the futures market,
suggesting that the ASI does a better job of forecasting interest rate
changes. The model works better for 3-month hedges than for 6-month
hedges, possibly because it is more difficult to predict rates over longer
periods.
In the analysis of the risk associated with the selective hedge, the
ASI predictions prove superior to the futures predictions, particularly
for the 3-month hedge.
Separating the data into the three groups to determine POWER produces
results that are no better than leaving them separate. This may be due to
the reduced number of observations that result from separating the data.
There is some concern over whether trends in the data severely bias
the results of this study. The model consistently shows greater
improvement over the "always hedge" case than over the "never hedge" case,
suggesting that interest rates trend downward during the period covered by
this study. Equal, but opposite, trends should result in the selective
hedge showing an increase in improvement over the "never hedge" and a
decrease in improvement over the "always hedge" case, unless the decision
rules are biased towards indicating rate decreases. One way to check for
this bias would be to reverse the data and add it to the original data
100
set, thus providing equal portions of data trending up and down.
Unfortunately, the use of forecast data and implied forward rates in this
model prohibits the reversing of the data.
The choice of the decision rules to be followed does have some effect
on the results of the selective hedge. But there is no evidence indicate
ing an overall preference of one particular decision rule over another.
The benefits appear to be a result of peculiarities in the data> more than
anything else. The model does not offer any explanation to this.
The results of this model could be improved by better and more
frequent forecast data. The added benefits of using such data would have
to be weighed against the extra cost of obtaining it. These costs may be
beyond the reach of the typical agricultural bank.
When the results are interpreted in actual dollar figures, the
selective hedging strategy appears to work as well for the 6-month case as
it does for the 3-month case. This is because the longer term of the 6-
month MMC, relative to the 3-raonth MMC, necessarily increases the amount
of interest the bank is required to pay. Therefore, a certain percent
savings in liability rates is necessarily worth more for a 6-month MMC
than for a 3-month MMC, in terms of the actual payments involved.
Risk reduction capabilities of the selective hedging strategy cannot
be put into dollar terms very well, but they can be compared to the
unhedged and hedged positions. For both the 3-Tnonth and 6-month cases,
the selective hedging strategy shows great improvement over the unhedged
position and compares well with the hedged position.
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